On July 16, 2007, President Bush called for "an international meeting" to be attended by "representatives form nations that support a two-state solution" to the historic Israeli-Palestinian dispute, "reject violence, recognize Israel's right to exist, and commit to all previous agreements between the parties." The meeting would be chaired by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. It would review institution-building progress in the West Bank, seek to explore "innovative and effective ways to support further reform" and lend "diplomatic support for the parties in their bilateral discussions and negotiations." In other words, it would likely be a meeting that is intended to provide a visible symbol that the Middle East is turning the proverbial corner toward peace. Assuming the conference is held--and it is not yet a certainty--no big breakthroughs are likely. There is even the danger that the outcome could demonstrate, not that progress is being made, but reveal just how formidable the barriers to progress are. In any case, if the conference's focus is narrowed to that of restarting bilateral negotiations between Israel and the West Bank Palestinian leadership with the objective that such future talks would reach an interim settlement, the conference can make a contribution toward Middle East peace.
If there is a historic model that can be referenced, it is the 1991 Madrid Conference. This conference was co-hosted by the United States and Soviet Union. It brought together Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestinian leaders with the Palestinians comprising a joint Jordanian-Palestinian team. Its objective was to create a framework that produced peace agreements between Israel and Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. It also sought to create a mechanism by which Israel and the Palestinians could reach an interim arrangement and then move on to final settlement negotiations. Following the conference, a bilateral track culminated in the Jordan-Israel peace agreement of 1994. A separate track led to the Oslo process with the Palestinians, but that effort eventually collapsed amidst the violence of intifada and Yasser Arafat's refusal to accept President Clinton's bridging proposal for a historic final settlement. The Syria-Israel negotiations ended with Syria unwilling to compromise over a tiny strip of land a few hundred meters in width.
This time around, any international conference will likely produce a lesser outcome. In 1991 the Cold War had ended with U.S. preeminence, the U.S. was fresh off a smashing military victory over Iraq that had liberated Kuwait, it enjoyed goodwill among numerous Arab states, and the its contribution to the Middle East's balance of power gave it enormous leverage in striving to alter the region's political dynamics. Then, the region's Arab states had a strong incentive to cultivate a political and strategic relationship with the United States. Today, the U.S. is locked in a virtual stalemate in Iraq, its grand ambition to build a liberal democracy there has been narrowed to the minimalist goal of leaving a self-sustaining government in Baghdad, Iran is now the region's rising power, Arab public opinion toward the United States is overwhelmingly negative, and President Bush and a Democratic Party-led Congress are locked in their own power struggle in Washington. As a result, the U.S. lacks the military, political, and diplomatic credibility it possessed back in 1991. In addition, Israel's indecisive outcome during last summer's military operation against Hezbollah has damaged its bargaining leverage.
Should such a conference take place, a number of dynamics could conspire against any major breakthroughs. First, as President Bush will not be chairing the conference, the extent of U.S. commitment could be discounted. Second, the conference could provide a forum for public posturing by the various parties. If so, rather than bridging differences in laying a path toward future bilateral negotiations, the conference could open up fresh divisions. Third, with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert facing difficulties stemming from the Winograd Committee's investigation into the Israel-Hezbollah fight and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas having lost control of the Gaza Strip, political weakness could limit the extent of commitments each party can grant. Fourth, Syria could take an intransigent stand in seeking to use future cooperation as a means to leverage concessions from the United States. For example, it could attempt to link participation in future talks to the UN's dropping the Hariri investigation. Fifth, it could attempt to thwart a separate peace track with the West Bank. After all, if the West Bank's leadership later reached agreement with Israel, Syria would be the lone holdout and this could further isolate it diplomatically. In turn, because President Abbas indirectly holds Syria responsible for Hamas' seizure of the Gaza Strip on account of its hosting a number of senior leaders from Hamas, Abbas could attempt to undermine prospects for a Syria-Israel track. Sixth, the shadow of rising Iranian power will likely overshadow the conference. With Iran on a path toward regional hegemony, Arab states might be unwilling to commit to too much so as to leave options open for dealing with a dominant Iran down the road, particularly if they calculate that the U.S. could disengage, at least to some extent, from the region following the 2008 Presidential election. For Arab leaders, it might be worth it to await the outcome of the U.S. elections before proceeding too far down a path on which a future U.S. President could place reduced emphasis. Seventh, the inclusion of too many parties could lead to Arab states "ganging up" to reaffirm demands that Israel withdraw to the pre-1967 War boundaries.
All said, if the international conference is held--and there is a real chance it will never take place--it is unlikely to bring about any major breakthroughs on the substantive issues that currently divide Israelis and Arabs. If progress is to be achieved, rather than focusing on lofty but unattainable goals, it should pursue the specific objective of creating a framework for a new round of bilateral discussions between Israel and the West Bank's Palestinian leadership. Those new negotiations should be aimed at reaching an interim agreement that would seek to write a new narrative of co-existence and mutual trust between Israelis and Palestinians.
Under such an arrangement, the West Bank's Palestinian leadership would be required to make a serious good faith effort to apprehend and prosecute those who threaten or carry out attacks against Israelis. The Palestinian leadership would also work to dismantle all armed militias outside the security forces, something President Abbas has already pledged to do. In return, Israel would remove its security restrictions and armed forces from agreed portions of the West Bank. It would also bar new settlement construction in those areas. Any existing Israeli settlers would be offered the choice of returning to Israel with reasonable relocation compensation or falling under Palestinian jurisdiction. The Madrid Quartet would monitor implementation of the agreement.
In the end, a conference that avoids "internationalizing" the long-running Arab-Israeli dispute, but instead seeks to re-open the proverbial door to bilateral tracks, starting with the one between the West Bank's Palestinian leadership and Israel, has the best chance to make some progress. However, to do so, its organizers will need to avoid the temptation of seeking grand legacy-making objectives that might appeal to President Bush as his tenure approaches an end, as none of the parties are in a position to pursue, much less reach, a final settlement. Modest and incremental progress is possible. The conference should aim to realize that possibility.
Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.
